Is Morality Subject To Luck?
In this essay I am going to argue that patterns of everyday human judgments do not make morality subject to luck. Here I only consider resultant luck, which is “luck in the way one’s actions and projects turn out”. The steps in my argument for this thesis are: 1) I will present the argument in a form of the dilemma argument from moral luck that rules out any plausible account of morality. 2) I will attack premise two of this argument by Williams’ account of moral luck, which considers rational justification for actions and show that his defense of morality from luck is not successful.3) I then again attack the second premise by drawing a distinction between peoples’ judgments with respect to the wrongness or rightness of actions and the rewards or punishments that people assign to these actions. I present the experiment by Fiery Cushman to prove premise 2 of the dilemma wrong. 4) I therefore conclude that the evaluation of reward or punishment towards actions is influenced by luck due to the evolutional design of the way people learn. However, morality with respect to moral worth can remain free from resultant luck and a plausible account of morality cannot be ruled out on the grounds of resultant moral luck.
1) The dilemma argument from moral luck and Williams argument for rationality
I outline the dilemma argument from moral luck that renders any account of morality implausible.
P1 Either the morality is immune to luck or it isn’t
P2 If morality is immune to luck there is no explanation for the patterns of everyday moral judgments as they do depend on luck in many cases and seem to commit us to the existence of moral luck
P3 If morality is not immune to luck it is contingent and unfair and cannot be associated with the common conception of recognizable morality which serves to provide justifications for our actions
C There is no account of morality that provides justification for our actions
2) Williams’ Argument Against Moral Luck
I use Williams argument for rational justification to attack premise 2.Williams rejects the existence of moral luck taking the Kantian position. He believes that it is essential for the notion of morality to be immune to luck in order to provide people with a sense of fairness. Williams argues in favor of ethics. He claims that it is rational judgment instead of moral judgment that is subject to luck. He shows how one can be rationally justified in performing an action, which is subject to luck by giving the example of Gauguin, who leaves his family and goes to Gaiti to become a painter. The judgment on the outcome cannot be made prior to the decision. However, as Williams points out it is rational to sympathise with Gauguin and to consider his action rational because of what he did actually achieve. In the case of Gauguin the rational justification of his action depends solely on his success and success is dependent on luck. Therefore, rationality is indeed subject to luck. Morality, however, is not. P2 is restated as follows
P*2 If morality is immune to luck the explanation for the patterns of everyday moral judgments is that these judgments are formed on the basis of the rationality of the outcome. Such rational judgments are subject to luck but do not interfere with the extent to which the action is moral.
The conclusion then is that morality remains immune to luck and the plausible account of morality can be given.
However then another problem arises. I can object to Williams’s account by pointing out that in the Gauguin’s case people then appeal to the principles of rationality and prioratise these over morality. I do not see how Williams saves morality from luck as by doing it he also “saves “ morality from its main feature of being a supreme value. My point can be illustrated by a simple logical argument. Williams puts the argument as follows:
If morality has the characteristics of being a supreme value and of being not affected by luck, then morality has value.
In the circumstances affected by luck people appeal to rationality, so morality is not affected by luck.
Morality is a supreme value
Therefore, morality has value.
1) (r &¬s) →p
2) m→¬s
3) m
4) ¬s
5) r
6) p
However, I suppose that it is correct to point out to the hidden premise (3) that Williams leaves unstated. This is “If people appeal to the principles of rationality rather than morality is not a supreme value”
1) (r &¬s) →p
2) m→¬s
3) m→¬r
4) m
5) ¬s
6) ¬r
7) ¬p
It follows that morality then has no value and Williams’s solution of the dilemma should be rejected. I therefore reject Williams defense of morality from luck.
3) The Two Types of Moral Assessment
Now I address a different approach to the denial of moral luck. To deny moral luck means to accept the Control Principle, CP, which states that:
“We cannot be morally assessed for what is due to factors beyond our control”.
These, however, is an ambiguous criterion for moral assessment. The way to understand “moral assessment” usually splits into two separate approaches. These are the moral assessment with respect to moral responsibility and the moral assessment with respect to moral worth of an action. The former depends on luck, the later does not. The assessment of moral responsibility is influenced by the structure of the society and consequentialist ideas, whereas moral worth has a more objective meaning defined by the notion of morality as a supreme value. This distinction allows preserving morality free from luck with respect to the notion of moral worth of an action but dependent on luck with respect to blame or praise for an action.
In order to reject P2 I use the experiment by Fiery Cushman, which explains the everyday patterns of behavior that make morality seem luck dependent. The experiment makes people throw darts in a board and a person judging their throws. Before people make a throw they also call their shots; calls are ensured to be honest. The way people hit influences whether the person judging loses or wins money. People throwing do not know which outcomes are good or bad. Half of the people throwing are rewarded or punished on the outcome of their hits and the other half are judged by the intent. The experiment shows that the group judged by the outcome learns much better than the other group. The experiment concludes that it is the feature of how people learn that they learn on outcomes. Therefore, the patterns of everyday judgments are influenced by luck because they are made on the outcomes, which ensure greater learning. Such consequentialist approach governs the evaluation of actions in the society and justifies people’s behavior. This however does not make judgments about moral worth of actions dependent on luck, as these are independent from a desire to teach and impose a certain form of behavior. Moral worth of an action can be evaluated independent from the context or consequences of an action. Therefore the assessment of moral worth remains immune to luck. It is now possible to reject P2 and conclude that everyday patterns of judgment do allow the possibility of morality, which is immune to luck, and therefore a plausible account of morality can exist.
4) Conclusion
In this essay I argued that morality is not subject to the cases of resultant luck. I formed a dilemma argument from moral luck that undermines a possibility of any plausible account of morality. Frist I attacked the second premise of the argument by the account of rational judgement suggested by Williams. I rejected this defence of morality as it leaves morality no value. I then considered the distinction between moral assessment with respect to moral responsibility and moral worth. I argued that premise 2 of the dilemma argument can be rejected using the psychological explanations for the patterns of human judgment. I justified my claim by the experiment by Cushman that proves that the features of human learning make judgment depend on the outcome of an action. I concluded that people’s judgment with respect to moral blame or praise does depend on luck. However, this does not make the notion of moral worth dependent on luck.
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