In this essay I will argue that it is permissible to care about how well off people are in relation to each other. I will use egalitarianism as a moral theory that justifies relative wellbeing and prioritarianism as a moral theory, which defends absolute levels of wellbeing. I will address what is in my opinion the most powerful objection to egalitarianism - the levelling down objection (LDO). The steps in my argument for this thesis are: 1) I will present the two versions of egalitarianism and show that the both can be rejected by LDO.2) I will outline the structure of prioritarianism as an alternative to egalitarianism and argue that it is a better moral theory as it is not subject to LDO.I will then show that prioritarianism is in fact also subject to LDO by giving a simple example where such case is presented. 3) I will argue that egalitarianism cannot be rejected on the grounds of LDO and should be considered at least as good moral theory as prioritarianism. I will therefore conclude that it is permissible to care about how well off people are in relation to each other not solely about how badly off people are in absolute terms.
1) Egalitarianism and LDO
In his "Equality and Priority" Parfit outlines two versions of egalitarianism; these are deontic and telic.
Telic egalitarianism states that inequality is bad in itself while equality has intrinsic value. According to the deontic view, it is unjust that some people are worse off then others but equality is not in itself good. I now argue that both versions of egalitarianism are subject to the LDO. The argument can be summarised as follows:
Argument I
P1 A moral theory that brings about implausible outcomes cannot be accepted
P2 When leveling down is permitted it brings about implausible outcomes
P3 Adoption of egalitarianism will render leveling down permissible and desirable
C Egalitarianism is not a moral theory that can be accepted.
Here I need to show how egalitarianism is subject to LDO.
I first consider telic egalitarianism. According to telic egalitarianism, we must level down whenever there is inequality as inequality is in itself bad. To illustrate: if half of population in the world has a physical impairment X and the other half is healthy, it is morally permissible and even morally required to level down by imposing X on the healthy half and thereby making everyone equally worse off. This example clearly illustrates that telic egalitarianism brings about implausible outcomes; it can be rejected using (I). Deontic egalitarianism also falls under the above argument although not so obviously. I argue that deontic egalitarians accept that:
(A) "There is something that is in itself morally bad about an outcome in which some are unjustly worse off than others"(Ingmar, 2007,p. 296).
Therefore, on the deontic view although it is not required to level down for the sake of producing equality, there is some value in doing it since it would reduce the injustice to those who are worse off (the first half of the population in the above example). I don't see how such position can be justified. I maintain that even if LD is not required for the sake of equality in itself, leaving it permissible brings about implausible outcomes and deontic egalitarianism can be rejected by (I). From this follows that caring about how badly off people are in relation to each other brings about monstrous consequences and should be rejected.
2) Prioritarianism and LDO
I now consider if caring about how badly off people are in absolute terms is more justified. In order to avoid LD Parfit proposes a theory prioritarianism. According to prioritarianism,
"Benefiting individuals matters more the worse off these individuals are" (Parfit, 1997,p. 213). Therefore, equality is not of any concern. We are obliged to benefit a person because she is badly off in absolute sense not because she is worse off than the rest. The argument (I) when applied to prioritarianism then does not succeed, as prioritarianism does not render LD permissible or desirable.
I now argue that prioritarianism is in fact subject to LDO and thus can be rejected by (I) as well as egalitarianism.
I do this by providing a simple example which relies on the idea that prioritarianism is committed to impersonal value:
Imagine a population Y where all people enjoy a particular level of wellbeing and we can assume just equality. Now one more person, Jack is added to the population. He is also benefited in a way that makes him more well off than the rest of the population. However, nobody is harmed. I am inclined to state that there is nothing bad in such addition and it increases the aggregate welfare on utilitarian grounds. For a prioritarian the answer will be different: the need to level down now arises, as the initial population is now worse off. Prioritarianism would imply that "a levelling down is better in one respect that after it the average moral weight of benefits has increased so that benefiting people now becomes more important"(Ingmar, 2007 p. 301). This example further leads to implausible consequences: benefiting will always be for the worse. " Whenever someone is benefited without anyone being harmed it will be the case that the benefits received in the end state have on average less moral weight than the benefits received in the start state had, since recipients are now absolutely better off" (Ingmar, 2007 p301). Therefore, when prioritarianism is defined properly and its commitment to impersonal value is considered it also falls under (I) and cannot be accepted.
It is possible to avoid LD and defend prioritarianism by arguing that a greater moral weight of benefits received is a bad feature of an outcome. This weight will then be decreased when Jack with a larger level of benefits is added to Y. Such view does not require LD but does not eliminate implausible consequences. For now it would follow that when individuals in Y enjoy a particular wellbeing it is always bad and such badness will be reduced by individuals becoming better off-but this state will not be bad for the individuals.
Therefore, prioritarianism is also subject to LDO or has other implausible consequences with respect to impersonal value. It cannot be a better moral theory than egalitarianism with respect to LDO.
3) Egalitarianism Reconsidered &Conclusion
Here I want to state my thesis again. I argue that it is permissible to care about how well off people are in relation to each other. In the discussion above I have shown that egalitarianism is subject to LDO. However, I have further shown that its best proposed alternative, prioritarianism, which aims to avoid the problem of levelling down does not in fact do any better with respect to this issue. Therefore, it cannot be impermissible to be concerned how well off people are in relation to each other because of LDO.I want to stress that egalitarian theory does not restrict itself to the view of strong or telic egalitarianism. Within the framework of deontic egalitarianism equality is not given preference over other values. Moreover, there exist a number of variations egalitarianism which adopt assumptions such as:
-"An increase in wellbeing for some when others are not affected is always morally better all things considered and a decrease in wellbeing for some when others are not affected is always morally worse all things considered though they are less so in proportion to the degree to which those affected are unjustly better off then others."-Imposing such assumption clearly avoids LDO and makes (P3) in the argument (I) false which means that its conclusion does not follow anymore. From the above follows that deontic egalitarianism is in no way weaker moral theory than prioritarianism and it can be more powerful in many respects (eg: dealing with impersonal value) as it allows a variety of adjustments. I therefore conclude that egalitarianism cannot be rejected on the grounds of LDO in favour of prioritarianism. It is permissible to care about how badly off people are in relation to each other not just how badly off they are in absolute terms.
In this essay I argued that it is permissible to be concerned how badly off people are in relation to each other and that egalitarianism cannot be rejected by LDO in favor of prioritarianism. I showed that egalitarianism is subject to the leveling down objection, which makes it an implausible moral theory. I considered prioritarianism as an alternative theory that is aims to avoid LDO.I then illustrated how prioritarianism can also be subject to LDO when defined properly and outlined its implausible consequences. I then considered egalitarianism again to show that it can avoid many of its implausible consequences by imposition of different assumptions when it is not restricted to strong or telic versions of egalitarianism. I therefore concluded that prioritarianism cannot be preferred to egalitarianism because of LDO and egalitarianism should not be rejected because of this objection.
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